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Recently, a welcome trend has emerged – in addition to the traditional studies on con-
tents and states of consciousness, levels of consciousness have become a matter of
research. However, there are some conceptual and methodological difﬁculties with this
research – the labels used for empirical measurement of levels are ambiguous and under-
speciﬁed while the research on neural correlates of consciousness has not been well
linked to psychophysical approaches to studying the levels of consciousness. This article
suggests a perspective on how to advance the psychophysics of measuring the levels by
precisely specifying level-speciﬁc contents and how to relate the distinction between con-
tents and levels to the distinction between the underlying brain mechanisms necessary
for processing contents and regulating the level of consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
In terms of direct phenomenal experience, living subjects can be
in two alternative basic states – the conscious and the uncon-
scious state. The unconscious state cannot be characterized by
its phenomenal contents because there are none; the examples
include dreamless NREM sleep, coma, or states of being fainted or
knocked out. Conscious state has phenomenal contents by default,
characterized by variable qualia present in direct experience and
appearing to a subject with variable “vividness” or “clarity.” The
basic conscious aware/awake state also varies along a continuum
of levels, speciﬁed as a position on a scale above unconsciousness –
e.g., from dream consciousness in REM sleep, drowsiness, up to
fully alert awake consciousness (Laureys and Tononi, 2009; Seth
et al., 2011). The levels have been typically deﬁned by objective
indices of arousal and responsiveness where a mixture of objective
physiological measurements and behavioral responses by subjects
has been used; contents are deﬁned by subjects’ reports (Lau-
reys, 2005; Laureys and Tononi, 2009; Hudetz and Pearce, 2010;
Cavanna et al., 2011).
In Figure 1 the views of these approaches are illustrated in
a generic simpliﬁed form. However, the approach illustrated in
Figure 1 includes an inconsistency: state dependent levels are
typically measured by objective means (yobj), but level-speciﬁc
conscious experiences have to be measured by subjective intro-
spective means (y subj). The x-axis is typically left for contents. As
one axis cannot represent two substantially different kinds, we
need another axis – the z-axis for subjective measures of levels.
We do this by “taking out” the “hidden” y subj from the y-axis
of levels, leaving it exclusively for yobj. Now, the y–z correspon-
dences can be established by research where objective measures
and signatures y will be related to the corresponding subjec-
tive measures of level, z. For example, a NREM sleep signature
of EEG specifying a point of value low on y-axis could ﬁnd a
correspondence in a near-zero point of value on z (e.g., extremely
rare, negligible dream experiences). Steady EEG occipital alpha-
suppression/beta enhancement signature having a relatively high y
value could correspond to a relatively high value z (e.g., clear and
vivid waking awareness of some scene). But even this approach
is not complete because it is impossible to evaluate and mea-
sure subjective levels without measuring subjective contents of
consciousness (awareness; Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010). The
level-speciﬁc experiences z inevitably have their qualitative con-
tents x. Correspondences z–x should be established. Figure 2
illustrates this.
The scientiﬁc approach to consciousness has been concerned
with ﬁnding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) either in
terms of correlates of its contents (x) or in terms of correlates of
general states (operationalized as levels y here). Unfortunately,
the third dimension (subjective levels z) has remained largely
ignored. Yet, if we have to measure objective counterparts of
some subjective kinds, these subjective kinds have to be mea-
surable as well. This applies not only to subjective contents (x),
but to subjective levels (z) as well. Recently, a welcome trend
has surfaced trying to integrate or combine these approaches,
including addition of the concept of levels of consciousness to
the specialist vocabulary and development of relevant methods
for its measurement (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard
et al., 2006; Hohwy, 2009; Dienes et al., 2010; Overgaard and
Overgaard, 2010; Seth, 2010). Informed intuitions have lead to
development of abstract computational approaches for measuring
levels with the help of the concepts of causal density and inte-
grated information (e.g., Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Seth et al.,
2011). It seems not difﬁcult in principle to ﬁnd an empirical
basis for testing the ﬁt between the predictions about the level
obtained from these computations and brain-process signatures
(m/EEG, fMRI) associated with different behavioral levels. This
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FIGURE 1 | A generic illustration of the traditional approach used for
characterizing state-specific levels of consciousness (diagonal x =y )
by relating levels of wakefulness (as measured by objective
psychophysiological and behavioral criteria typical for definite states;
axis y ) and the concomitant variety of awareness content (as
measured by subjective reports; axis x ).
FIGURE 2 | Main correspondences between objective measures of
level of consciousness (y ), subjective measures of level of
consciousness (z) and measures of content (x ). (The projection y–x is
omitted for parsimony, but it is potentially relevant as well).
means using y-axis for assessing correspondences between actual
real levels and computed abstract measures of levels. However, a
major problem is how to ﬁnd scientiﬁcally sound methods for
measurement of the subjective phenomenal levels (z). I will point
out some reasons why this problem persists, suggest where some
progress could be made and conclude with the notion that and
how identifying and combining neural mechanisms specialized
for processing contents and for regulating levels may be a valuable
approach.
ASSESSMENT OF STATES, LEVELS, AND CONTENTS
As stated above, researchers suggest to use an additional basic con-
cept – the levels of consciousness, to be used for characterizing a
richer continuum between fully unconscious and fully conscious
states (e.g., Seth et al., 2008; Hohwy, 2009; Overgaard and Over-
gaard, 2010). In the clinical context there is a long tradition to
evaluate levels of consciousness with the help of differentiation of
physiological–behavioral states such as using the Glasgow coma
scale (Teasdale and Jennett, 1974; Sleigh et al., 2010) or other
methods (e.g., consult Laureys and Tononi, 2009). Because clinical
methods have been “behavioristic,” they have a limited use when
we want to study levels of phenomenal consciousness and do this
also in experimental situations with impoverished stimuli. Thus,
the above mentioned trend to use the concept of subjective levels
is indeed valuable.
Both contents and levels are assumed to be expressed in dif-
ferent degrees of clarity or degradation of subjective experience
(Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010).
Projectionof a position y i onto a position z i speciﬁes an experience
with a certain level of clarity typical for the objectively speciﬁed
state-related level at that value of y ; projection of a position x i onto
a position z i speciﬁes an experience of certain content according
to how it is characterized by a deﬁnite degree of clarity. But how
can we measure degrees of subjective clarity? Historically, the tra-
dition to measure degrees of perceptual consciousness goes back
to the early microgenetic experiments (Bachmann, 2000). There,
subjects in experiments rated their experiences of stimuli-objects
by different adjectives corresponding to the different degrees of
clarity – e.g., “something unspeciﬁed,” “vague,” “diffuse,” “undif-
ferentiated,”“almost clear,”“clear,”etc. In a highly similar way, such
gradations hoped to be helpful in characterizing varying levels are
used also by modern researchers (e.g., Overgaard and Overgaard,
2010). Indeed, there is no other way to distinguish between the
levels of consciousness than to use qualitatively different contents
for this purpose (Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010). In terms of the
present framework the subjective levels speciﬁed by a value on z-
axis cannot be known unless characterized by a certain experience
having its qualitative contents measurable along the x-axis. In this
respect, the two approaches are consistent. Overgaards suggest that
the “most clearly” experienced contents determines the present
level of consciousness. Special introspection-based psychophysical
methods of evaluation of the level of awareness through quantiﬁ-
able degrees such as perceptual awareness scale (PAS) have been
developed (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg et al., 2010).
When PAS is used for evaluating the level of target stimulus’ phe-
nomenal experience, observers choose one of the four scale values
in each trial of stimulus presentation – (1) No experience, (2) Brief
glimpse, (3) Almost clear image, and (4) Absolutely clear image.
There are already some promising results showing usefulness of
PAS and other analogous scaling approaches for the measure-
ment of the phenomenal level (e.g., Sandberg et al., 2011, found
different dynamics of the awareness function and objective per-
formance function with varying stimulation parameters). Yet, the
ambiguity of the concepts used to describe and measure the lev-
els (z) continues to make obstacles for a satisfying development
of the consciousness science. The main problem is that because
level (z) cannot be measured unless subject experiences certain
contents (x) corresponding to that level, there should be a satis-
factory and well measurable grounding of the z-measures onto
the x-measures. Up to now the empirically well founded z-to-x
projection is lacking.
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research March 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 82 | 2
Bachmann Linking contents to levels
PROBLEMS WITH MEASUREMENT OF LEVELS AND A
SUGGESTED ADVANCEMENT
Although introducing and productively using PAS (or other
similar scales) is deﬁnitely a step forward, several problems remain.
First, if levels (z and/or y) are measured only through intro-
spective contents (x) by adjectives “clear,” “almost clear,” “weak
glimpse,”etc., it is difﬁcult to use them reliably. These terms are (1)
ambiguous (allowing variable interpretation) and (2) underspec-
iﬁed psychophysically (we do not know the objective equivalents
in stimuli attributes on which evaluations are based). Although
we agree that degrees of a level (z) are speciﬁed indirectly with
the help of some graded aspects of the subjective contents (x),
the adjectives used in PAS and other similar instruments bear
too much uncertainty. Degrees vary with variations in the per-
ceived features and feature values of the contents – brightness,
contrast, fragmentariness, spatial frequency, sharpness/blur, etc.
For example, the pictures of cats used by Overgaard and Over-
gaard, 2010, p. 2) for explaining clarity of perception can be
psychophysically evaluated for their brightness/darkness, con-
trast, spatial frequency of detail. (See Figure 3 for examples from
the Overgaards’ article.) The precisely measurable psychophysical
qualities should be made the basis of evaluation of the levels-by-
contents in addition to or instead of the ambiguous and under-
speciﬁed attributes such as the “almost clear,” “clear,” “vivid,” etc.
In other words, the positions on the x-axis have to be speci-
ﬁed more precisely and with labels that have a well measurable
and speciﬁc enough psychophysical attributes. The vague clarity-
labels can be decomposed to the labels that better correspond
to the physical equivalents of measurement. Each subjective level
must have its established objective stimulus-reference for con-
tent. For example, among the kitty pictures in Figure 3 the
left one, when compared to the right one, appears to have less
blur, higher contrast, lower overall apparent brightness, higher
salience values of image elements, etc. Promising experimental
methods for a more precise measurement of subjective levels
include: forced choice among many objective examples poten-
tially similar to the subjective percepts (e.g., variably contrasted,
blurred, fragmented objective images); thorough qualitative inter-
views distilled into inter-subjective descriptive invariants; gather-
ing overwhelmingly typical depictions (e.g., drawings) produced
by independent observers as the standard objective equivalents for
FIGURE 3 | Examples of pictures used by Overgaard and Overgaard
(2010) to illustrate the perception according to different subjective
levels of clarity.
subjective experiences. Understandably, from the practical point
of view this means additional work because for each stimulus
environment used in a particular study (and with certain subjects)
objective stimuli examplesmimickingdifferent subjective contents
that correspond to different levels should have been prepared in
preliminary experiments.
The principal method to “objectivize” the introspective phe-
nomenal levels-by-contents of target stimulus awareness would
consist in using objective stimuli-references for this purpose. We
would ﬁnd out the contents (x i) of perceptual experience that
correspond to a certain scale point of the level (z i), but in order
to do this in a less ambiguous and a well objectivized way we
would produce objective depictions of the stimuli according to
which ones among a prepared variety are evaluated as best corre-
spondences to the perceived level-speciﬁc contents by the subjects.
For example, as a ﬁrst step, we can run preliminary studies with
varying experimental conditions where subjects produce variable-
content drawings representative of subjective stimulus experience
or where subjects participate in a forced choice procedure where
they have to choose among a multitude of pre-set stimulus exam-
ples prepared as the likely representatives of subjective stimulus
experience. Typical produced or prevailingly chosen objective
counterparts (references) are found for each level of awareness and
reference stimuli with considerable inter-observer correspondence
will have been selected. Thereafter, as a second step, one can run
main experiments where different subjects have to perceive the
target stimuli again in varying conditions – consider variations
in objective stimulation conditions such as exposure duration
or contrast or variation in subjective state such as drowsiness,
intoxication, wakeful alertness, etc. In a forced choice procedure
subjects then choose between the objectivized reference stim-
uli prepared in the ﬁrst stage of research and corresponding to
the different levels-by-contents. If subjects often choose a refer-
ence that corresponds to some content associated with a lower
level related experience, it can be concluded that level of con-
scious awareness in perceiving the target stimulus was relatively
low. (Objective experimental means for obtaining variable levels
of target stimuli experience include variable exposure durations,
masking SOAs, contrast levels, attentional resource availability,
etc. The subject-related means for obtaining or taking advan-
tage of variable levels of target stimuli experience include timing
from waking up, psycho-stimulant or -depressant use, treatment
with anesthetics, etc.) Understandably, different modalities and
domains of stimuli will have their own contents based speciﬁc
measured out gradations of levels.
The second problem emerges when we ask again – conscious-
ness of what ? For instance, Overgaard and Overgaard (2010)
specify the level “barely conscious” as “not characterized by any
content” (p. 2). Suppose we ﬁnd that the highest degree of target
awareness under given circumstances is “something characterized
by no contents.” However, absence of experienced content for
target stimuli (and impossibility to choose any reference stim-
ulus offered) need not mean there is no subjective content at
all. Non-target content can relate to the level of consciousness
in different ways not necessarily specifying only one level of
consciousness. Targets may not be perceived in their full-level
or lower level consciousness for various reasons; non-perceived
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targets can be inferred by fully conscious subjects from the other,
well experienced cues or by logical inferences. When subjects
report “no experience” of targets they can guess, but guesses are
founded on certain subjective experiential states dependent on
expectancies, memory, vague intuitive feelings, etc. The partial
awareness account (Kouider et al., 2010) argues that reported
target stimulus awareness may result not only from the direct
experience of the target as supported by exhaustive bottom-up
processing, but also from the lower level conscious representa-
tion (of the partial information) insufﬁcient for target experience
in itself, but sufﬁcient for subserving the top-down effects cre-
ating illusory conscious percepts. In this case the lower level
target consciousness is associated with higher-level non-target
consciousness. Based on the feeling of a “weak glimpse,” a level
of consciousness is termed “barely conscious,” but it may be “fully
conscious by a weak glimpse” instead. Consequently, PAS-like
scales should be developed further by specifying them according
to the objective criterion contents on which the clarity-evaluations
are founded. Here again the above suggested procedures of objec-
tivization by ﬁnding and using level-speciﬁc reference stimuli
could help.
The third problem appears because an invariant physical stim-
ulus can be perceived as having one or another content and
associated with a varying degree of clarity. One-time percep-
tion of a stimulus undergoes a microgenetic percept formation
with qualitatively different subjective contents alternating in real
time (Bachmann, 2000). The level of consciousness of a stimulus
progressively changes along the unfolding microgenesis. Conse-
quently, various levels as being based on varying contents can be
speciﬁed also within each single instance of target perception with
invariant subject’s state. We should distinguish whether the result-
ing contents based measurement of the level is determined by (1)
the objective stimulus parameters, (2) the state of the subject,or (3)
the stage the microgenesis of percept has reached, given invariant
stimulus and state.
Cognition is prone to illusions and subjectively vivid non-
veridicalities accompanied by high conﬁdence (Bachmann, 2004;
Kouider et al., 2010). Hence the fourth problem: reports on tar-
get clarity, even if ﬁne-tuned with the help of objective reference
stimuli, cannot be used as the only criteria with which we mea-
sure conscious contents and levels. It is useful to look for the
objective brain-process signatures of subjective clarity and conﬁ-
dence, combined with the earlier mentioned behavioral methods
of validation of levels of experience by reliable inter-subjective
objectivization.
Up to now, brain-imaging of NCCs has been split between
studying contents and studying states (Hohwy,2009;Kouider et al.,
2010). Distinction between content- and level-speciﬁc neural sys-
tems is scarce (e.g., Seth et al., 2008). Interactivity between neural
systems specialized for contents and for level of expression of
consciousness has been rarely used (e.g., Bachmann, 1984, 1999;
Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Ribary, 2005). Although in terms
of the subjective criteria used for specifying the levels we can-
not overcome the contents-dependence of the “level” (Overgaard
and Overgaard, 2010), we can objectively study interactivity and
mutual inﬂuences between the content-speciﬁc brain systems and
the level-regulating brain systems.
BRAIN MECHANISMS USEFUL FOR PROCESSING CONTENTS
AND REGULATING LEVELS
Earlier, I have suggested distinguish between (1) brain mecha-
nisms for pre-conscious and conscious cognitive–perceptual pro-
cessing of contents and (2) brain mechanisms for modulation
of the content-speciﬁc processes up to the level sufﬁcient for
conscious experience of these contents (Bachmann, 1984, 1999,
2000). Recently, Lamme (2010) presented a neural stance for dif-
ferentiating four stages of processing as related to phenomenal
consciousness. However, as Lamme’s work is concerned primar-
ily with the aspect of contents and does not consider level-related
processes, I will not extend the discussion of Lamme’s work in
the context of the present paper. For example, Lamme’s model
lacks contribution of the non-speciﬁc reticulo-thalamic mecha-
nisms (the system for regulating levels). His is a cortical process
theory of conscious vs. unconscious processing. In my opinion,
without incorporating the mechanisms of thalamo-cortical inter-
action objective differences between unconscious vs. conscious
processing and between contents vs. levels of consciousness can-
not be understood (Bachmann, 1984, 1999, 2000). In my view, the
key to a successful approach for meaningfully relating the subjec-
tive contents (x) and subjective levels (z) is to ascertain if there
are brain mechanisms specialized, accordingly, for processing the
contents and regulating the levels.
Whenwe supplement the introspectivemeasurements byobjec-
tive physiological measurements distinguishing between the con-
tribution of the brain mechanisms for contents and brain mecha-
nisms for levels, an opportunity emerges. This stance presupposes
a possibility to distinguish between neural signatures (neural
correlates, NC) associated with levels of processing and neural
signatures (NC) associated with contents of processing. NC for
the contents (NCcont) could be found such that they objectively
and veridically discriminate between stimuli. (In terms of Kouider
et al., 2010, this gives a premise either for unconscious, partially
conscious or fully conscious access to the contents.) Overcom-
ing the ambiguity of the acronym NCC (which stands for both the
contents and the level of consciousness) we could term contents of
consciousness as the contents of processing speciﬁed by NCcont,
but also supplemented by additional neural processes X that exem-
plify the level of processing necessarily present in the conscious
state. Stated simply,NCcont+X=NCC.ThisX is not only the fac-
tor responsible for processing at the level where the pre-conscious
contents become conscious contents, but also the factor that allows
contents to be expressed at a variable level, if modulations per-
formed by X are incrementally leading to changes in the contents
(x) that stand for varying levels (z). Most signiﬁcantly, being able
to measure contributions of NCcont to the levels-by-contents
and contributions of X to the levels-by-contents separately we
will have an additional means to differentiate and measure lev-
els and contents from the same metatheoretical perspective and
do this in a more objective way. Thus, an important direction of
empirical research should be to ﬁnd links between subjects’ eval-
uations produced by advanced (i.e., more precisely objectivized)
PAS-type scales and brain-process signatures indicative of relative
involvement of NCcont and X.
Does this perspective have any scientiﬁc evidence in its sup-
port? I think the answer is afﬁrmative. It is widely accepted that
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the level of consciousness (both in terms of y and in terms of
z) is a function of the extended reticulo-thalamo-cortical system
that itself does not process the perceptual contents, but is capable
of modulating how clear, non-fragmented, steady, and veridical
the experience of contents is (Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Ribary,
2005; Laureys and Tononi, 2009; Hudetz and Pearce, 2010). This
is a good candidate for being the mechanism X. It is important
to notice that although the main function of the thalamo-cortical
modulation system is to enable consciousness and modulate the
speciﬁc contents-carrying cortical neurons, the thalamo-cortical
complex does indeed specify content and level together. This is
because the axons from this system project onto content-speciﬁc
pyramidal neurons in the cortex and the effect of the modulating
system inevitably manifests in contentful experiences. From the
point of view of necessary ongoing research this means that we
should disentangle andmeaningfully relate brain processes indica-
tive of the contribution of the modulating system and processes
indicative of the contribution of the primary speciﬁc afference that
(can) function(s) autonomously from X.
Speciﬁc contents can be veridically processed by the special-
ized cortical modules even though the level of activity remains
below the threshold needed for consciousness (Bachmann, 1999;
Baars et al., 2003; Rose, 2006; Kouider et al., 2010). This repre-
sents the mechanisms that produce NCcont. In the perceptual
retouch theory (Bachmann, 1999, 2000) cortical speciﬁc mod-
ules fulﬁll the function of NCcont. If non-speciﬁc thalamo-
cortical modulation (the X) of the nodes standing for NCcont
becomes effective, the level of activity signiﬁed by NCcont is
upgraded so that pre-conscious contents become conscious con-
tents; NCcont+X=NCC. It is easy to see that NCC involves
recorded processes indicative of interaction of the content-wise
non-speciﬁc, level-regulating processes and the content-wise spe-
ciﬁc processes. In the dynamically changing product of the inter-
active workings of the mechanisms signiﬁed by NCcont and
mechanisms of X both contents and level are integrated. In a nut-
shell, thalamo-cortical non-speciﬁcmodulation regulates the level,
which leads to microgenetically advancing integration of contents
represented by cortical nodes (by which we can evaluate level),
which all can be controlled by cortical top-down operations as the
set of access mechanisms. It would be a nagging task to explore
whether mechanism for NCcont serves primarily the function of
conveying information,with X serving the function of integration.
If this proves to be true, we will have a conceptualization harmo-
nious with theories where levels of consciousness are a function
of information being integrated (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Seth
et al., 2011).
At this point it is important to comment on the possi-
bility of two types of content. It is possible that there are
sensory–perceptual features that can be reliably represented by the
contents-system unconsciously (i.e., information transmitted and
stored without much loss even if the level-regulating system has
not upgraded these representations to the phenomenally explicit
level). Information is present, but it is not integrated with the
conscious scene. For example, color, low-to-medium spatial fre-
quency content, orientation, form, typical object conﬁguration, an
image of a threatening face, and some other types of content can
be listed here. Then there may be other features and attributes
that could be more intimately dependent on the inﬂuence of
the level-regulating system, such as subjective contrast, high spa-
tial frequency edges, fragmentariness/unity of experienced scene,
temporal frequency of subjective change, etc. An important exper-
imental taskwould be to try to differentiate between the features or
attributes of contents that are highly sensitive to the modulation
by the level system and features that can be represented invari-
antly beginning from the lowest level of consciousness up to its
highest level. The task of disentangling NCC that are signatures
of the contribution of the system X from the neural signatures
of the contribution of the system that already pre-consciously can
encode level-independent contents seems equally important. Here
is a speculative example: it is possible that we ﬁnd ERP or spectral
perturbation signatures that are invariant to different levels, but
signify encoding of certain visual-categorical contents invariantly
with levels; vice versa – we may ﬁnd signatures that are invari-
ant to level-independent contents, but vary with varying levels.
For example, fast ERP components that can be evoked also in
sleeping or anesthetized subjects may stand for the former and
N100–150 or slow negative potentials may stand for the latter.
With invasive electrodes permitting LFP or single-cell recording
the perspective of the above described strategy seems even bet-
ter. (Consider ﬁring of face-sensitive neurons independent of how
vividly or whether consciously at all the subject processes a face
stimulus while the level-determining systems’ activity ﬂuctuates.
Alternatively, consider invariant ﬁring of an intralaminar thala-
mic neuron whether the contents of conscious perception vary
or not.)
Fully conscious experiences are not limited to perception
of the environmental stimulation – consider dreams, hallucina-
tions, spontaneous recollections. Compared to the psychophysical
approach, the approach acknowledging (NCcont+X) helps to
objectivize the levels-by-contents of consciousness when endoge-
nous experiences are the case. As people cannot imagine, dream,
or hallucinate about anything that could not consist of the com-
bination of the elements of phenomenal experiences founded on
the learned objective stimulus attributes, it should be possible, in
principle, to interpret the NCC for assessing the level. This can be
based on the results of the earlier research on perception of the
objective stimulation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have suggested twodirections of research and theory
in an attempt to advance measurement of levels of consciousness.
First, there appears to be a need for methods that help to objec-
tivize the introspectively founded scales used in evaluating the
levels of conscious experience through the concomitant graded
contents. Second, it seems useful to distinguish between brain
mechanisms for contents of consciousness and for regulating the
levels of consciousness. The described approach has merit because
the known neurophysiology of unconscious as well as conscious-
level experience involves modular brain systems for representing
speciﬁc content and being capable of working under different lev-
els of consciousness (Baars et al., 2003; Rose, 2006). On the other
hand, the reticulo-thalamic modulating system that itself does not
carry information about the contents can upgrade the activity
of the speciﬁc system so that its contents become represented at
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the phenomenal explicit level (Bachmann, 1999; Ribary, 2005).
Thus, it was inviting to speculate that the distinctions between
contents and levels (e.g., Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010) may
be mechanistically founded, respectively, on the brain systems
signifying NCcont and brain systems X. Becoming conscious of
certain contents and varying the levels of conscious experience
depends on interactive workings of the systems for NCcont and
systems X. In a purely behavioral experiment it is never possible to
distinguish the contributions of the contents- and levels-systems
whereas it seems realistic inprinciple to accomplish this distinction
by brain-imaging and decomposing the NCcont+X.
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